Chosen-ciphertext security is by now a standard security property for asymmetric encryption. Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. This paper presents an automated procedure for analyzing generic asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model. This procedure has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare-
INTRODUCTION
Our day-to-day lives increasingly depend upon information and our ability to manipulate it securely. This requires solutions based on cryptographic systems (primitives and protocols). In 1976, Diffie and Hellman invented public-key cryptography, coined the notion of one-way functions and discussed the relationship between cryptography and complexity theory. Shortly after, the first cryptosystem with a reductionist security proof appeared (Rabin 1979) . The next breakthrough towards formal proofs of security was the adoption of computational security for the purpose of rigorously defining the security of cryptographic schemes. In this framework, a system is provably secure if there is a polynomial-time reduction proof from a hard problem to an attack against the security of the system. The provable security framework has been later refined into the ex- * This work is partially supported by the project AVOTE, SCALP and SFINCS Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. act (also called concrete) security framework where better estimates of the computational complexity of attacks are achieved. While research in the field of provable cryptography has achieved tremendous progress towards rigorously defining the functionalities and requirements of many cryptosystems, little has been done for developing computeraided proof methods or more generally for investigating a proof theory for cryptosystems as it exists for imperative programs, concurrent systems, reactive systems, etc...
In this paper, we present an automated proof method for analyzing generic asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model (ROM). Generic encryption schemes aim at transforming schemes with weak security properties, such as one-wayness, into schemes with stronger security properties, especially security against chosen ciphertext attacks. Examples of generic encryption schemes are [11, 23, 21, 5, 6, 19, 18, 17] . The paper contains two main contributions. The first one is a compositional Hoare logic for proving IND-CPA-security. That is, we introduce a simple programming language (to specify encryption algorithms that use one-way functions and hash functions) and an assertion language that allows to state invariants and axioms and rules to establish such invariants. Compositionality of the Hoare logic means that the reasoning follows the structure of the program that specifies the encryption oracle. The assertion language consists of three atomic predicates. The first predicate allows us to express that the value of a variable is indistinguishable from a random value even when one gives the values of a set of variables (or some simple expressions on variables). The second predicate allows us to state that it is computationally infeasible to compute the value of a variable given the values of a set of variables. Finally, the third predicate allows us to state that the value of a variable has not been submitted to a hash function.
Transforming the Hoare logic into an (incomplete) automated verification procedure is quite standard. Indeed, we can interpret the logic as a set of rules that tell us how to propagate the invariants backwards. We have done this for our logic resulting in a verification procedure implemented in less than 250 lines of CAML. We have been able to automatically verify IND-CPA security of several schemes among which [5, 18, 17] . Our Hoare logic is incomplete for two main reasons. First, IND-CPA security is an observational equivalence-based property, while with our Hoare logic we establish invariants. Nevertheless, as shown in Proposition 3.1, we can use our Hoare logic to prove IND-CPA security at the price of completeness. That is, we prove a stronger property than IND-CPA. The second reason, which we think is less important, is that for efficiency reasons some axioms are stronger than needed.
The second contribution of the paper presents a simple criterion for plaintext awareness (PA). Plaintext awareness has been introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in [6] . It has then been refined in [4] such that if an encryption scheme is PA and IND-CPA then it is IND-CCA. Intuitively, PA ensures that an adversary cannot generate a valid cipher without knowing the plaintext, and hence, the decryption oracle is useless for him. The definition of PA is complex and proofs of PA are also often complex. In this paper, we present a simple syntactic criterion that implies plaintext awareness. Roughly speaking the criterion states that the cipher should contain as a sub-string the hash of a bitstring that contains as substrings the plaintext and the random seed. This criterion applies for many schemes such as [5, 17, 18] and easy to check. Although (or maybe because) the criterion is simple, the proof of its correctness is complex.
Putting together these two contributions, we get a proof method for IND-CCA security.
An important feature of our method is that it is not based on a global reasoning and global program transformation as it is the case for the game-based approach [7, 20] . Indeed, both approaches can be considered complementary as the Hoare logic-based one can be considered as aiming at characterizing, by means of predicates, the set of contexts in which the game transformations can be applied safely.
Related work.
We restrict our discussion to work providing computational proofs for cryptosystems. In particular, this excludes symbolic verification (including ours). We mentioned above the game-based approach [7, 20, 15] . In [8, 9] B. Blanchet and D. Pointcheval developed a dedicated tool, CryptoVerif, that supports security proofs within the game-based approach. CryptoVerif is based on observational equivalence. The equivalence relation induces rewriting rules applicable in contexts that satisfy some properties. Invariants provable in our Hoare logic can be considered as logical representations of these contexts. Moreover, as we work with invariants, that is we follow a state-based approach, we need to prove results that link our invariants to game-based properties such as indistinguishability (cf. Proposition 3.1 and 3.12). Our verification method is fully automated. It focusses on asymmetric encryption in the random oracle model, while CryptoVerif is potentially applicable to any cryptosystem.
G. Barthe and S. Tarento were among the first to provide machine-checked proofs of cryptographic schemes without relying on the perfect cryptography hypothesis. They formalized the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model in the Coq proof assistant, and used this formalization to prove hardness of the discrete logarithm [1] , security of signed ElGamal encryption against interactive attacks [3] , and of Schnorr signatures against forgery attacks [22] . They are currently working on formalizing the game-based approach in Coq [2] . D. Nowak provides in [16] an implementation in Coq of the game-based approach. He illustrates his framework by a proof of the semantic security of the encryption scheme ElGamal and its hashed version. Another interesting work is the Hoare-style proof system proposed by R. Corin and J. Den Hartog for game-based cryptographic proofs [10] . The main difference between our logic and theirs is that our assertion language does not manipulate probabilities explicitly and is at a higher level of abstraction. On the other hand, their logic is more general. In [12] , Datta et al. present a computationally sound compositional logic for key exchange protocols. There is, however, no proof assistance provided for this logic neither.
Outline: In Section 2, we introduce notations used for defining our programming language and generic asymmetric encryption schemes. In Section 3, we present our method for proving IND-CPA security. In Section 4 we introduce a criterion to prove plaintext awareness. In Section 5 we explain the automated verification procedure derived from our Hoare logic. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.
DEFINITIONS
We are interested in analyzing generic schemes for asymmetric encryption assuming ideal hash functions. That is, we are working in the random oracle model [13, 5] We only consider distribution ensembles that can be constructed in polynomial time by probabilistic algorithms that have oracle access to O. Given two distribution ensembles X = {Xη}η∈AE and X = {X η }η∈AE, an algorithm A and η ∈ AE, we define the advantage of A in distinguishing Xη and X η as the following quantity:
We insist, above, that for each hash function H, the probabilities are also taken over the set of maps with the appropriate type. Let Adv(η, X, X ) = sup A (Adv(A, η, X, X )), the maximal advantage taken over all probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms. Then, two distribution ensembles X and X are called indistinguishable if Adv(η, X, X ) is negligible as a function of η and denoted by X ∼ X . In other words, for any polynomial-time (in η) probabilistic algorithm A, Adv(A, η, X, X ) is negligible as a function of η. We insist that all security notions we are going to use are in the ROM, where all algorithms, including adversaries, are equipped with oracle access to the hash functions.
A simple programming language for encryption and decryption oracles
We introduce a simple programming language without loops in which the encryption and decryption oracles are specified. The motivation for fixing a notation is obvious: it is mandatory for developing an automatic verification procedure. Let Var be an arbitrary finite non-empty set of variables. Then, our programming language is built according to the following BNF described in Table 1 , where for a bit-
N is the name of the oracle, c its body and x and y are the input and output variable respectively. Note the command y[n, m] is only used in the decryptions, it is why we do not have to consider it in our Hoare logic. With this language we can sample an uniform value to x, apply a way function f and its inverse f −1 , a hash function, the exclusive-or, the concatenation and substring function, and perform an "if-then-else" (used only in the decryption function).
Example 2.1. The following command encodes the encryption scheme proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in [5] (shortly E (ine; oute) = f (r)||ine ⊕ G(r)||H(ine||r)): 
, S(ÌH ).dom, respectively S(ÌH ).res, denotes the list obtained by projecting each pair in S(ÌH ) to its first, respectively second, element.
A program takes as input a configuration (S, H, (f, f −1 )) and yields a distribution on configurations. A configuration is composed of a state S, a vector of hash functions (H1, . . . , Hn) and a pair (f, f −1 ) of a trapdoor permutation and its inverse. Let Γ denote the set of configurations and Dist(Γ) the set of distributions on configurations. The semantics is given in Table 2 , where δ(x) denotes the Dirac measure, i.e. Pr(x) = 1. Notice that the semantic function of commands can be lifted in the usual way to a function from Dist(Γ) to Dist(Γ). By abuse of notation we also denote the lifted semantics by [[c]] .
A notational convention: It is easy to prove that commands preserve the values of H and (f, f −1 ). Therefore, we can, without ambiguity, write
). According to our semantics, commands denote functions that transform distributions on configurations to distributions on configurations. However, only distributions that are constructible are of interest. Their set is denoted by Dist(Γ, H, ) and is defined as the set of distributions of the form:
where A is an algorithm accessing f , f −1 and H and which records its queries to hashing oracles into the ÌH's in S.
Asymmetric Encryption
We study generic constructions that convert any trapdoor permutation into a public-key encryption scheme. More specifically, our aim is to provide an automatic verification method for generic encryption schemes. We also adapt IND-CPA and IND-CCA security notions to our setting.
• is a trapdoor permutation generator that on input η generates an η-bit string trapdoor permutation (f, f −1 ) 
We 
IND-CPA SECURITY
In this section, we present an effective procedure to verify IND-CPA security. The procedure may fail to prove a secure encryption scheme but never declares correct an insecure one. Thus, we sacrifice completeness for soundness, a situation very frequent in verification 2 . We insist that our procedure does not fail for any of the numerous constructions we tried.
We are aiming at developing a procedure that allows us to prove properties, i.e. invariants, of the encryption oracle. More precisely, the procedure annotates each control point of the encryption command with a set of predicates that hold at that point for any execution except with negligible probability. Given an encryption oracle E (ine, oute) : c we want to prove that at the final control point, we have an invariant that tells us that the value of oute is indistinguishable from a random value. As we will show, this implies IND-CPA security.
A few words now concerning how we present the verification procedure. First, we present in the assertion language the invariant properties we are interested in. Then, we present a set of rules of the form {ϕ}c{ϕ } meaning that execution of command c in any distribution that satisfies ϕ leads to a distribution that satisfies ϕ . Using Hoare logic terminology, this means that the triple {ϕ}c{ϕ } is valid.
From now on, we suppose that the adversary has access to the hash functions H, and he is given the trapdoor permutation f , but not its inverse f −1 .
The Assertion Language
Our assertion language is defined by the following grammar, where ψ defines the set of atomic assertions: 2 We conjecture that the IND-CPA verification problem of schemes described in our language is undecidable. [
where c is the body of N . Intuitively, Indis(νx; V1; V2) is satisfied by a distribution on configurations, if any adversary has negligible probability to distinguish whether he is given the value of x or a random value, even when he is additionally given the values of the variables in V1 and the image by the one-way permutation of those in V2. The assertion WS(x; V ) is satisfied by a distribution, if any adversary has negligible probability to compute the value of x, even when he is given the values of the variables in V . Finally, H(H, e) is satisfied when the value of e has not been submitted to the hash oracle H.
Notations: We use Indis(νx; V ) instead of Indis(νx; V ; ∅) and Indis(νx) instead of Indis(νx; Var). We also write V, x instead of V ∪ {x} and even x, y instead of {x, y}.
Formally, the meaning of the assertion language is defined by a satisfaction relation X |= ϕ, which tells us when a distribution on configurations X satisfies the assertion ϕ. In order to define the satisfaction relation X |= ϕ, we need to generalize indistinguishability as follows. Let X be a family of distributions in Dist(Γ, H, ) and V1 and V2 be sets of variables in Var. By D(X, V1, V2) we denote the following distribution family (on tuples of bit-strings):
Here S(V1) is the point-wise application of S to the elements of V1 and f (S(V2)) is the point-wise application of f to the elements of S(V2). We say that X and X are V1; V2-indistinguishable, denoted by X ∼V 1 ;V 2 X , if
D(X, V1, V2) ∼ D(X , V1, V2).
Example 3.1. Let S0 be any state and let H1 be a hash function. Recall that we are working in the ROM. Consider the following distributions:
where p is a polynomial. Then, we have X ∼ {y};{x} X but we do not have X ∼ {y,x};∅ X , because then the adversary can query the value of H1(x) and match it to that of y.
The satisfaction relation X |= ψ is defined as follows:
• X |= true, X |= ϕ ∧ ϕ iff X |= ϕ and X |= ϕ .
• X |= Indis(νx; V1; V2) iff X ∼V 1 
] is negligible, for any adversary A.
S(e) ∈ S(ÌH ).dom] is negligible.
The relation between our Hoare triples and semantic security is established by the following proposition that states that if the value of oute is indistinguishable from a random value then the scheme considered is IND-CPA.
generic encryption scheme. It is IND-CPA secure if {true}c{Indis(νoute; oute, ine)} is valid.
If {true}c{Indis(νoute; oute, ine)} holds then the encryption scheme is secure with respect to randomness of ciphertext. It is standard that randomness of ciphertext implies IND-CPA security.
A Hoare Logic for IND-CPA security
In this section we present our Hoare logic for IND-CPA security. We begin with a set of preservation axioms that tell us when an invariant established at the control point before a command can be transferred to the next control point. Then, for each command, except x := f −1 (y), x := y[n, m] and conditional, we present a set of specific axioms that allow us to establish new invariants. The commands that are not considered are usually not used in encryption but only in decryption procedures, and hence, are irrelevant for IND-CPA security.
Generic preservation rules:
We assume z = x and c is either x r ← U or x := y||t or x = y ⊕ t or x := f (y) or x := H(y) or x := t ⊕ H(y).
Lemma 3.2. The following axioms are sound, when x ∈ V1 ∪ V2:
• (G1) {Indis(νz; V1; V2)} c {Indis(νz; V1; V2)}
• (G2) {WS(z; V1)} c {WS(z; V1)} • (G3) {H(H , e[e /x])} x := e {H(H , e)}, provided H = H in case e ≡ H(y).
Here, e[e /x] is the expression obtained from e by replacing x by e .
Random Assignment:
Lemma 3.3. The following axioms are sound:
← U {H(H, e)} if e is x or is of the form e1||x||e2, x||e2 or e1||x.
Moreover, the following preservation axioms, where we assume x = y 3 , are sound:
← U{WS(y; V, x)}
Axiom (R1) is obvious. Axiom (R2) takes advantage of the fact that U is a large set, or more precisely that its cardinality is exponential in the security parameter, and that since e contains the fresh generated x the probability that it has already been submitted to H is small. Axioms (R3) and (R4) state that the value of x cannot help an adversary in distinguishing the value of y from a random value in (R3) or computing its value in (R4). This is the case because the value of x is randomly sampled. Henceforth, we write x ∈ var(e) to state that e is x or is of the form e1||x||e2, x||e2 or e1||x.
Hash Function:
Lemma 3.4. The following basic axioms are sound, when x = y, and α is either a constant or a variable:
• (H1){WS(y; V ) ∧ H(H, y)}x := α ⊕ H(y) {Indis(νx; V, x)} • (H2){H(H, y)} x := H(y){H(H , e)}, if
e is x or is of the form e1||x||e2, x||e2 or e1||x.
• (H3){Indis(νy; V ; V , y) ∧ H(H, y)}x := H(y) {Indis(νx; V, x; V , y)} if y ∈ V
Axiom (H1) captures the main feature of the random oracle model, namely that the hash function is a random function. Hence, if an adversary cannot compute the value of y and this latter has not been hashed yet then he cannot distinguish H(y) from a random value. Axiom (H2) is similar to axiom (R2). Axiom (H3) uses the fact that the value of y can not be queried to the hash oracle.
3 By x = y we mean syntactic equality.
Lemma 3.5. The following preservation axioms are sound provided that x = y and z = x:
• (H4) {WS(y; V ) ∧ WS(z; V ) ∧ H(H, y)}x := H(y) {WS(z; V, x)} • (H5) {H(H, e) ∧ WS(z; y)}x := H(y){H(H, e)}, if z ∈ var(e) ∧ x / ∈ var(e)
• ( The idea behind (H4) is that to the adversary the value of x is seemingly random so that it can not help to compute z. Axiom (H5) states that the value of e not having been hashed yet reminds true as long as e contains a variable z whose value is not computable out of y. (H6) and (H7) give necessary conditions to the preservation of indistinguishability that is based on the seemingly randomness of a hash value.
One-way Function:
Lemma 3.6. The following axiom is sound, when y ∈ V ∪ {x}:
Axiom (O1) captures the one-wayness of f . Axiom (O2) is obvious since f (y) is given to the adversary in the precondition and axiom (O3) follows from the fact that y and z are independent. Axiom (P1) simply ensues from the fact that f is a permutation.
The Xor operator
In the following axioms, we assume y = z.
Lemma 3.8. The following axiom is sound when y ∈ V1 ∪ V2:
Moreover, we have the following axioms that are sound provided that t = x, y, z.
• (X2) {Indis(νt; V1, y, z; V2)}x := y ⊕ z {Indis(νt; V1, x, y, z; V2)}
• (X3) {WS(t; V, y, z)}x := y ⊕ z{WS(t; V, y, z, x)}
To understand axiom (X1) one should consider y as a key and think about x as the one-time pad encryption of z with the key y. Axioms (X2) and (X3) take advantage of the fact that is easy to compute x given y and z.
Concatenation:
Lemma 3.9. The following axioms are sound:
• (C2) {Indis(νy; V1, y, z; V2)∧Indis(νz; V1, y, z; V2)} x := y||z {Indis(νx; V1; V2)}, if y, z ∈ V1 ∪ V2
• (C3) {Indis(νt; V1, y, z; V2)}x := y||z {Indis(νt; V1, x, y, z; V2)}, if t = x, y, z
(C1) states that if computing a substring of x out of the elements of V is hard, then so is computing x itself. The idea behind (C2) is that y and z being random implies randomness of x, with respect to V1 and V2. Eventually, x being easily computable from y and z accounts for rules (C3) and (C4).
In addition to the axioms above, we have the usual sequential composition and consequence rules of the Hoare logic. In order to apply the consequence rule, we use entailment (logic implication) between assertions as in Lemma 3.10.
Lemma 3.10. Let X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, ) be a distribution ensemble:
If X |= WS(x; V ) and V ⊆ V then X |= WS(x; V ).

If X |= Indis(νx; V1; V2 ∪ {x}) and V
The soundness of the Hoare Logic follows by induction from the soundness of each axiom and soundness of the Consequence and Sequential composition rules. [5] .
1) (R1), (R2), and (R2).
2) (P 1), (O1), (G3), and (G3).
3) (H7), (H1), (H4), and (G3). 4) (X2), (X1), (X3), and (G3). 5) (G1), (G1), (C1), and (G3). 6) (H7), (H7), and (H1). 7) (C2) twice.
Extensions
In this section, we show how our Hoare logic, and hence our verification procedure, can be adapted to deal with on one hand injective partially trapdoor one-way functions and on the other hand OW-PCA (probabilistic) functions. The first extension is motivated by Pointcheval's construction in [18] and the second one by the Rapid Enhanced-security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform (REACT) [17] . For obvious reasons, we cannot recall the definitions of the security of these functions; we explain them informally.
The first observation we have to make is that Proposition 3.1 is too demanding in case f is not a permutation. Therefore, we introduce a new predicate Indis f (νx; V1; V2) whose meaning is as follows:
X |= Indis f (νx; V1; V2) if and only if
Notice that, when f is a bijection, Indis f (νx; V1; V2) is equivalent to Indis(νx; V1; V2) (fi can be the identity function as in the last step of Example 3.3 and 3.4). Now, let oute, the output of the encryption oracle, have the form a1|| · · · ||an with ai = fi(xi). Then, we can prove the following:
Indis f i (νai; a1, . . . , an, ine)} is valid then GE is IND-CPA. Now, we introduce a new axiom for Indis f (νx; V1; V2) that replaces axiom (P1) in case the one-way function f is not a permutation:
Clearly all preservation rules can be generalized for Indis f . Injective partially trapdoor one-way functions: In contrast to the previous section, we do not assume f to be a permutation. On the other hand, we demand a stronger property than one-wayness. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function and let
Here f −1 is a partial function. The function f is said partially one-way, if for any given z = f (x, y), it is computationally impossible to compute a corresponding x. In order to deal with the fact that f is now partially one-way, we add the following axioms, where we assume x, y ∈ V ∪ {z} and where we identify f and (x, y) → f (x||y):
The intuition behind the first part of (PO1) is that f guarantees one-way secrecy of the x-part of x||y. The second part follows the same idea that (P1'). Example 3.3. We verify Pointcheval's transformer [18] . Indis(νb; a, b, ine) 1) (R1) and (R2); 2) (R3), (R1), (G3) and (R2); 3) (C3), (C1), (G3), and (G3); 4) (H7), (H1), and (G3); 5) New rule (P O1) and (G3); 6) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , and (H1); 7) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , and (G1).
Indis(νr; Var) ∧ Indis(νs; Var) ∧ H(G, r) ∧ H(H, ine||s) 3) w := ine||s Indis(νr; Var) ∧ WS(w; Var
To conclude, we use the fact that Indis f (νa; a, ine) and Indis(νb; a, b, ine) implies Indis f (νa; a, b, ine) OW-PCA: Some constructions such as REACT are based on probabilistic one-way functions that are difficult to invert even when the adversary has access to a plaintext checking oracle (PC), which on input a pair (m, c), answers whether c encrypts m. In order to deal with OW-PCA functions, we need to strengthen the meaning of our predicates allowing the adversary to access to the additional plaintext checking oracle. For instance, the definition of WS(x; V ) becomes:
] is negligible, for any adversary A. Now, we have to revisit Lemma 3.10 and the axioms that introduce WS(x; V ) in the postcondition. It is, however, easy to check that they are valid.
2) (R3), (R1), (R2) and (R2) 3) (P O1), (G3) and (G3). 4) Extension of (H7) to Indis f , (H1), (H4), and (G3). 5) Extension of (X2) to Indis f , (X1), (X3), and (G3). 6) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , (G1), (C1), and (G3). 7) Extension of (H7) to Indis f , (H7), and (H1). 8) Extension of (G1) to Indis f , (G1) and (G1).
PLAINTEXT AWARENESS
Bellare and Rogaway introduced plaintext awareness (PA) in [6] 4 . The motivation is to decompose IND-CCA security of an encryption scheme into IND-CPA and PA security. Indeed, a public-key encryption scheme that satisfies IND-CPA (in the ROM) and the original definition of PA is IND-CCA1 (in the ROM). PA has been refined in [4] such that if an encryption scheme is PA and IND-CPA then it is IND-CCA. Intuitively, plaintext awareness means that the decryption oracle can be simulated by a plaintext extractor that does not have access to the inverse permutation f −1 . Now we introduce a simple analysis that allows us to automatically verify that an encryption scheme is PA in the strong sense [4] . Hence, combined with the results of the previous sections we obtain an analysis that allows to verify IND-CCA security.
We recall the definition of PA-security following the notations and conventions of [4] . Let GE = ( , E (ine, oute) :
c ) be a generic encryption scheme. An adversary B for plaintext awareness is given the public permutation f , oracle access to the encryption algorithm E and to the ideal hash functions H = H1, · · · , Hn. His goal is to output a cipher-text that cannot be correctly decrypted by the plaintext extractor. Hence, the success of plaintext extractor K against B in the distribution X ∈ Dist(Γ, H, ) is defined by: The rest of the section is organized as follows. We first introduce a semantic condition on D that implies the existence of a plaintext extractor. Then, we provide a syntactic criterion that implies the semantic criterion.
In the remainder of this section, we consider an encryption scheme GE that uses the hash functions H = H1, · · · , Hn. We assume that c has the following form c1; h := H1(t);
if V( x, h) = v then out d := m else out d := "error" fi, where x is a vector of variables (possibly empty) and V is a function (possibly the identity in which case we do not write it) such that for given x and v, P r[r r ← U : V( x, r) = v] is negligible. Furthermore, we require that the hash function H1 is not called in c1 and that the encryption algorithm c makes exactly one call to the oracle H1. Consider, for instance, the scheme in [5] , f (r)||ine ⊕ G(r)||H(ine||r). Here, t gets assigned the value ine||r. We call the condition V( x, h) = v (or equivalently V( x, H1(t)) = v) the "sanity check ".
It allows us to discriminate valid cipher-text from arbitrary bit-string. We also assume that decryption behaves correctly with respect to encryption: if y is generated using the algorithm of encryption, then the value of t as computed by the decryption oracle coincides with the value used as argument in the call to H1 by the encryption algorithm. 
